Questions regarding 'epistemic injustice' in knowledge-intensive policymaking: Two examples from Dutch health insurance policy.

In contemporary healthcare policies the logic of Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) is typically proposed as a way of addressing a demand to explicitly justify policy decisions. Policymakers' use of 'evidence' is presumed to pertain to ideals of justice in decision-making. However, according to some, EBM is liable to generate 'epistemic injustice' because it prefers quantitative types of evidence and - as a result of that - potentially undervalues the qualitative testimonies of doctors and patients. Miranda Fricker's concept of 'epistemic injustice' refers to a wrong done to a person in their capacity as a knower. This paper explores the usefulness and limits of this concept in the context of public decision-making. How is evidence-based policymaking intertwined with questions of 'epistemic injustice'? Drawing from ethnographic research conducted at the National Health Care Institute, we analyze two cases of EBM-inspired policy practices in Dutch social health insurance: 1) the use of the principles of EBM in making a public reimbursement decision, and 2) private insurers' use of quantitative performance indicators for the practice of selective contracting on the Dutch healthcare market. While the concept of 'epistemic injustice' misses some key processes involved in understanding how 'knowing gets done' in public policy, it does shed new light on priority-setting processes. Patients or medical professionals who are not duly recognized as credible and intelligible epistemic agents, subsequently, lack the social power to influence priority-setting practices. They are thus not merely frustrated in their capacity to be heard and make themselves understood, they are potentially deprived of a fair share in collective financial and medical resources. If we fail to recognize inequalities in credibility and intelligibility between diverse groups of knowers, there is a chance that these epistemic inequalities are being reproduced in our system of health insurance and our ways of distributing healthcare provisions.

Collective constructions of 'waste': epistemic practices for disinvestment in the context of Dutch social health insurance.

BACKGROUND: Faced with growing budget pressure, policymakers worldwide recognize the necessity of strategic disinvestment from ineffective, inefficient or harmful medical practices. However, disinvestment programs face substantial social, political and cultural challenges: mistrust, struggles for clinical autonomy or stakeholders' reluctance to engage in what can be perceived as 'rationing'. Academic literature says little about effective strategies to address these challenges. This paper provides insights on this matter. We analyzed the epistemic work of a group of policymakers at the National Health Care Institute on what was initially a disinvestment initiative within the context of the Dutch basic benefits package: the 'Appropriate Care' program. The Institute developed a strategy using national administrative data to identify and tackle low-value care covered from public funds as well as potential underuse, and achieve savings through improved organization of efficiency and quality in health care delivery. How did the Institute deal with the socio-political sensitivities associated with disinvestment by means of their epistemic work? METHOD: We conducted ethnographic research into the National Health Care Institute's epistemic practices. Research entailed document analysis, non-participant observation, in-depth conversations, and interviews with key-informants. RESULTS: The Institute dealt with the socio-political sensitivities associated with disinvestment by democratizing the epistemic practices to identify low-value care, by warranting data analysis by clinical experts, by creating an epistemic safe space for health care professionals who were the object of research into low-value care, and by de-emphasizing the economization measure. Ultimately, this epistemic work facilitated a collaborative construction of problems relating to low-value care practices and their solutions. CONCLUSIONS: This case shows that - apart from the right data and adequate expertise - disinvestment requires clinical leadership and political will on the part of stakeholders. Our analysis of the Institute's Appropriate Care program shows how the epistemic effort to identify low-value care became a co-construction between policymakers, care providers, patients and insurers of problems of 'waste' in Dutch social health insurance. This collective epistemic work gave cognitive, moral and political standing to the idea of 'waste' in public health expenditure.

"Strangers in the ER": Quality indicators and third party interference in Dutch emergency care.

RATIONALE, AIMS, AND OBJECTIVES: This paper examines a remarkable dispute between Dutch insurers, hospitals, doctors, and patients about a set of quality indicators. In 2013, private insurers planned to drastically reform Dutch emergency care using quality indicators they had formulated drawing from clinical guidelines, RCTs, and systematic reviews. Insurers' plans caused much debate in the field of emergency care. As quality indicators have come to play a more central role in health care governance, the questions what constitutes good evidence for them, how they ought to be used, and who controls them have become politically and morally charged. This paper is a case study of how a Dutch public knowledge institution, the National Health Care Institute, intervened in this dispute and how they addressed these questions. METHOD: We conducted ethnographic research into the knowledge work of the National Health Care Institute. Research entailed document analysis, participant observation, in-depth conversations, and formal interviews with 5 key-informants. RESULTS: The National Health Care Institute problematized not only the evidence supporting insurers' indicators, but also-and especially-the scope, purpose, and use of the indicators. Our analysis shows the institute's struggle to reconcile the technical rationality of quality indicators with their social and political implications in practice. The institute deconstructed quality indicators as national standards and, instead, promoted the use of indicators in dialogue with stakeholders and their local and contextual knowledge. CONCLUSIONS: Even if quality indicators are based on scientific evidence, they are not axiomatically good or useful. Both proponents and critics of Evidence-based Medicine always feared uncritical use of evidence by third parties. For non-medical parties who have no access to primary care processes, the type of standardized knowledge professed by Evidence-based Medicine provides the easiest way to gain insights into "what works" in clinical practice. This case study reminds us that using standardized knowledge for the management of health care quality requires the involvement of stakeholders for the development and implementation of indicators, and for the interpretation of their results.

Contested evidence: a Dutch reimbursement decision taken to court.

This paper examines a remarkable lawsuit in health care rationing. The Patients Association for Interstitial Cystitis sued the Dutch National Health Care Institute for alleged misconduct against Interstitial Cystitis patients, as the Institute decided that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid are no longer covered by the basic health insurance. The patients' organisation challenged the Institute for basing its standpoint on scientific evidence; overruling clinical expertise and patients' experiences. While scientific advice is often solicited in public health issues, simultaneously, the authority of scientific advice is increasingly being questioned in the public domain. Also, the judiciary is frequently called upon to adjudicate in rationing decisions. Based on an ethnographic study of the National Health Care Institute, drawing on insights from the field of Science and Technology Studies, we analyse this lawsuit as a negotiation of what knowledge counts in reimbursement decisions.